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Abstract
We extend the model of risk sharing with limited commitment (Kocherlakota, 1996) by
introducing both a public and a private (non-contractible and/or non-observable) stor-
age technology. Positive public storage relaxes future participation constraints and may
hence improve risk sharing, contrary to the case where hidden income or effort is the
deep friction. The characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations crucially depend
on the storage technology’s return. In the long run, if the return on storage is (i) mod-
erately high, both assets and the consumption distribution may remain time-varying;
(ii) sufficiently high, assets converge almost surely to a constant and the consumption
distribution is time-invariant; (iii) equal to agents’ discount rate, perfect risk sharing is
self-enforcing. Agents never have an incentive to use their private storage technology,
i.e., Euler inequalities are always satisfied, at the constrained-efficient allocation of our
model, while this is not the case without optimal public asset accumulation.
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1 Introduction
The literature on incomplete markets either restricts asset trade exogenously, most promi-
nently by allowing only a risk-free bond to be traded (Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994), or
considers a deep friction which limits risk sharing endogenously. With private information
as the friction, a few papers (Allen, 1985; Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001; Ábrahám, Koehne,
and Pavoni, 2011) have integrated these two strands of literature by introducing a storage
technology. This paper considers limited commitment (Thomas and Worrall, 1988; Kocher-
lakota, 1996), and makes a similar contribution by introducing both a public and a private
storage technology.
The model of risk sharing with limited commitment has been applied in several economic
contexts. In these applications, agents are likely to have a way to transfer resources intertem-
porally, both jointly and privately. However, typically neither public nor hidden storage is
considered. For example, in the context of village economies (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall,
2002), households may keep grain or cash around the house for self-insure purposes, and
there also exist community grain storage facilities. Households in the United States (Krueger
and Perri, 2006) may keep savings in cash or ‘hide’ their assets abroad. Spouses within a
household (Mazzocco, 2007) accumulate both joint assets and savings for personal use. Coun-
tries (Kehoe and Perri, 2002) may also have joint savings (in a stability fund, such as the
European Stability Mechanism, for example) in addition to their individual asset balances.
Consequently, the theoretical insights we derive in this paper can be useful to the further
development of these applications.
Our starting point is the two-sided lack of commitment framework of Kocherlakota (1996).
Risk-sharing transfers have to be such that each agent is at least as well off as in autarky at
each time and state of the world. The storage technology we introduce allows the planner
and the agents to transfer resources from one period to the next and earn a net return r,
−1 ≤ r ≤ 1/β − 1, where β is agents’ subjective discount factor.1
We first add only public storage. We assume that agents are excluded from the returns of
the publicly accumulated assets, an endogenous Lucas tree, when they default, as in Krueger
and Perri (2006).2 This implies that the higher the level of public assets is, the lower the
incentives for default are in this economy.
1Note that with r = −1 we are back to the Kocherlakota (1996) setting.
2Publicly stored assets may be protected by community enforcement (guards for public grain storage
facilities in villages), by contracts (divorce law for couples), or by international organizations (for countries).
Alternatively, one may think of an outside financial intermediary implementing public storage, as in our
decentralization, see Section 2.5. Note that Karaivanov and Townsend (2014) also assume the presence of a
financial intermediary for Thai villages.
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The characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations, such as long-run asset and con-
sumption dynamics, crucially depend on the return on storage. First, we show that public
storage is used in equilibrium as long as its return is sufficiently high and risk sharing is par-
tial in the basic model. Further, if the return on storage is moderately high, assets remain
stochastic and the consumption distribution varies over time in the long run. If the return on
storage is sufficiently high, assets converge almost surely to a constant and the consumption
distribution is time-invariant. Risk sharing remains partial as long as the storage technology
is inefficient, i.e., r < 1/β − 1, and perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing in the long run if the
return on storage is equal to agents’ discount rate.
To understand how public storage matters, note that limited commitment makes markets
endogenously incomplete, i.e., individual consumptions are volatile over time. This market
incompleteness triggers precautionary saving/storage motives for the agents and the planner.
At the same time, higher public assets reduce default incentives, thereby reducing consump-
tion dispersion and in turn the precautionary motive for saving. Further, agents would like
to front-load consumption as long as β(1 + r) < 1. Optimal public asset accumulation is
determined by these conflicting forces. If β(1 + r) = 1, it is optimal for the planner to fully
complete the market by storage in the long run. This is because the trade-off between im-
perfect insurance and an inefficient intertemporal technology is no longer present. Note that
there is no aggregate income risk in our environment, hence storage would never be used in
the first-best allocation. In other words, the aggregate asset dynamics in our model are due
to incomplete markets generated by the limited-commitment friction.
The introduction of public storage has new qualitative implications for the dynamics of
consumption predicted by the model when assets are stochastic in the long run. First, the am-
nesia property, i.e., that whenever an agent’s participation constraint binds the consumption
allocation depends only on his current income (Kocherlakota, 1996), does not hold. Second,
the persistence property of the basic model, i.e., that for ‘small’ income changes consumption
is constant, does not hold either. There is a common intuition behind these results: the past
history of shocks affects current consumptions through aggregate assets. Data on household
income and consumption support neither the amnesia, nor the strong persistence property
of the basic model (see Broer, 2013, for an extensive analysis). Hence, these differences are
steps in the right direction for the limited-commitment framework to explain consumption
dynamics.
We also show that constrained-efficient allocations can be decentralized as competitive
equilibria with endogenous borrowing constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) and a com-
petitive financial intermediation sector which runs the storage technology (Ábrahám and
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Cárceles-Poveda, 2006). In this environment, equilibrium asset prices take into account the
externality of aggregate storage on default incentives. In this sense, our paper provides a joint
theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and an endogenously growing (and shrinking)
asset/Lucas tree in equilibrium.
We then consider hidden (non-contractible and/or non-observable) storage as well. In
contrast to the basic model, agents no longer have an incentive to store at the constrained-
efficient allocation in our model with public storage.3 In other words, with optimal public
asset accumulation the social planner preempts the agents’ storage incentives. This is true
because the planner has more incentive to store than the agents. First, the planner stores for
the agents, because she inherits their consumption smoothing preferences. Second, storage by
the planner makes it easier to satisfy agents’ participation constraints in the future. In other
words, the planner internalizes the positive externality generated by accumulated assets on
future risk sharing.
This result means that the characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations in a model
with both public and private storage and a model with only public storage are the same.
This result also implies that agents’ Euler inequalities are always satisfied in our model
with limited commitment and public storage. The Euler inequality cannot be rejected in
micro data from developed economies, once labor supply decisions and demographics are
appropriately accounted for (Attanasio, 1999). Therefore, we bring limited commitment
models in line with this third observation about consumption dynamics as well.
In a private-information environment with full commitment, Cole and Kocherlakota (2001)
show that public storage is never used and agents’ private saving incentives are binding in
equilibrium, eliminating any risk sharing opportunity beyond self-insurance.4 When the deep
friction is limited commitment as opposed to private information, the results are very differ-
ent: first, public storage is used in equilibrium, and second, private storage incentives do not
bind. The main difference between the two environments is that in our environment more
public storage helps to reduce the underlying limited commitment friction, while with private
information public asset accumulation would make incentive provision for truthful revelation
more costly.
Finally, we study what are the overall effects of access to storage on welfare. These cru-
cially depend on the return on storage. The availability of storage increases the value of
autarky, which reduces welfare, while accumulated public assets improve long-run welfare,
3Note that this result does not hinge on how agents’ outside option is specified precisely: they may or
may not be allowed to store in autarky, and they may or may not face additional punishments for defaulting.
4See also Allen (1985) and Ábrahám, Koehne, and Pavoni (2011).
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both by decreasing consumption dispersion and increasing available resources. When the
return on storage is sufficiently high, there are welfare gains in the long run, because the
economy gets close to perfect risk sharing and aggregate consumption is higher than in the
basic model. When the return on storage is lower, the negative effect of a better outside
option dominates the positive effect of public assets on welfare. In the short run, public
asset accumulation also has costs in terms of foregone consumption. To see whether ac-
cess to storage improves welfare taking into account the transition from the moment storage
becomes available, we propose an algorithm to solve the model numerically. For the param-
eterizations we have considered, the short-term welfare losses dominate the long-run gains
for all returns on storage. However, given private storage, public asset accumulation always
improves welfare.
A few papers have considered limited-commitment economies with an intertemporal tech-
nology, either pure storage or capital accumulation. In Marcet and Marimon (1992) and
Kehoe and Perri (2002), the social planner allocates capital to the agents, which in turn in-
creases their outside option. In contrast, in our model agents cannot expropriate the public
assets upon default. In a risk sharing framework with limited commitment, Ligon, Thomas,
and Worrall (2000) consider observable and contractible individual storage and no public
storage. In their environment individual storage is used in equilibrium, in contrast to our
framework. Krueger and Perri (2006) introduce public assets of a constant size and show that
its presence increases the amount of risk sharing, as in our model. As opposed to our paper,
they do not endogenize the size of the asset/Lucas tree. Finally, Ábrahám and Cárceles-
Poveda (2006) introduce public capital and derive the recursive form of the problem, similar
to ours, but then they focus on the decentralization of the constrained-optimal allocation as
a competitive equilibrium. None of these papers, or any other in the limited-commitment
literature, to our knowledge, considers hidden storage.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces and characterizes
our model with public storage. Section 3 shows that agents’ private storage incentives are
eliminated under optimal public asset accumulation. Section 4 presents some computed
examples. Section 5 concludes with a summary and provides a broader perspective on our
results.
2 The model with public storage
We consider an endowment economy with two types of agents, i = {1, 2}, each of unit mea-
sure, who are infinitely lived and risk averse. All agents are ex-ante identical in the sense
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that they have the same preferences and are endowed with the same exogenous random
endowment process. Agents in the same group are ex-post identical as well, meaning that
their endowment realizations are the same at each time t.5 Let u() denote the utility func-
tion. We assume that it is characterized by harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA), i.e.,
u′(c) = (a + c)−σ, where a ≥ 0 and σ > 0.6 Note that HARA utility functions satisfy
prudence, i.e., u′′′() > 0. We further assume that inverse marginal, 1/u′(), is convex, that is,
σ ≥ 1. Some of our results, in particular, those relating to the long run, hold under weaker
assumptions. The common discount factor is denoted by β.
Let st denote the state of the world realized at time t and st the history of endowment
realizations, that is, st = (s1, s2, ..., st). Given st, agent 1 has income y(st), while agent 2 has
income equal to Y − y (st), where Y is the aggregate endowment. Note that there is no aggre-
gate risk in the sense that the aggregate endowment is constant.7 However, the distribution
of income varies over time. We further assume that income has a discrete support with J
elements, that is, y(st) ∈
{
y1, . . . , yj, . . . , yJ
}
with yj < yj+1, and is independently and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) over time, that is, Pr (y(st) = yj) = Pr (yj) = pij, ∀t. The assump-
tions that there are two types of agents and no aggregate uncertainty impose some symmetry
on both the income realizations and the probabilities. In particular, yj = Y − yJ−j+1 and
pij = piJ−j+1. The i.i.d. assumption can be relaxed, we only need weak positive dependence,
i.e., that expected future income is weakly increasing in current income.
Suppose that risk sharing is limited by two-sided lack of commitment to risk sharing
contracts, i.e., insurance transfers have to be voluntary, or, self-enforcing, as in Thomas and
Worrall (1988), Kocherlakota (1996), and others. Each agent may decide at any time and
state to default and revert to autarky. This means that only those risk-sharing contracts
are sustainable which provide a lifetime utility at least as great as autarky after any history
of endowment realizations for each agent. We assume that the punishment for deviation is
exclusion from risk-sharing arrangements in the future. This is the most severe subgame-
perfect punishment in this context. In other words, it is an optimal penal code in the sense
of Abreu (1988) (Kocherlakota, 1996). Note that so far our setting is identical to that of
Kocherlakota (1996).
We introduce a storage technology, which makes it possible to transfer resources from
today to tomorrow. Assets stored earn a net return r, with −1 ≤ r ≤ 1/β − 1. Note that if
5We will refer to agent 1 and agent 2 below. Equivalently, we could say type-1 and type-2 agents, or
agents belonging to group 1 and group 2.
6Note that relative risk aversion is constant for a = 0, and we get exponential utility with a = 1 and σ
approaching infinity.
7In Section 5 we discuss the case with aggregate risk.
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r = −1 we are back to the basic limited commitment model of Kocherlakota (1996). In this
section we only allow for public storage, to which defaulting agents do not have access (as
in Krueger and Perri, 2006). In Section 3 we also allow agents to store both in autarky and
along the equilibrium path in a hidden way.
The constrained-efficient risk-sharing contract is the solution to the following optimization
problem:
max
ci(st)
2∑
i=1
λi
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt Pr
(
st
)
u
(
ci
(
st
))
, (1)
where λi is the (initial) Pareto-weight of agent i, Pr (st) is the probability of history st
occurring, and ci (st) is the consumption of agent i at time t when history st has occurred;
subject to the resource constraints,
2∑
i=1
ci
(
st
) ≤ 2∑
i=1
yi (st) + (1 + r)B
(
st−1
)−B (st) , B (st) ≥ 0, ∀st, (2)
where B (st) denotes public storage when history st has occurred, with B (s0) given; and the
participation constraints,
∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
βr−t Pr
(
sr | st)u (ci (sr)) ≥ Uaui (st) , ∀st,∀i, (3)
where Pr (sr | st) is the conditional probability of history sr occurring given that history st
occurred up to time t, and Uaui (st) is the expected lifetime utility of agent i when in autarky
if state st has occurred today. In mathematical terms,
Uau1 (st) = u (y(st)) +
β
1− β
J∑
j=1
piju
(
yj
)
(4)
and Uau2 (st) = u (Y − y(st)) +
β
1− β
J∑
j=1
piju
(
yj
)
.
The above definition of autarky assumes that agents cannot use the storage technology
in autarky. Note, however, that the qualitative results remain the same under different
outside options as long as the strict monotonicity of the autarky value in current income is
maintained. For example, agents could save in autarky (as in Krueger and Perri, 2006, and in
Section 3), or they might endure additional punishments from the community for defaulting
(as in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002).
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2.1 Characterization preliminaries
We focus on the characteristics of constrained-efficient allocations. Our characterization
is based on the recursive-Lagrangian approach of Marcet and Marimon (2011). However,
the same results can be obtained using the promised-utility approach (Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti, 1990).
Let βt Pr (st)µi (st) denote the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint, (3),
and let βt Pr (st) γ (st) be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint, (2), when
history st has occurred. The Lagrangian is
L =
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt Pr
(
st
){ 2∑
i=1
[
λiu
(
ci
(
st
)) 1
2
+µi
(
st
)( ∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
βr−t Pr
(
sr | st)u (ci (sr))− Uaui (st)
)]
+γ
(
st
)( 2∑
i=1
(
yi (st)− ci
(
st
))
+ (1 + r)B
(
st−1
)−B (st))} ,
with B (st) ≥ 0. Note that our problem is convex, because the objective function is clearly
concave, the resource constraint is linear, and it has been shown that the participation
constraints define a convex set in models with limited commitment and capital accumulation
as long as autarky utility does not depend on the capital stock, B here, see Sigouin (2003).8
Therefore, the first-order conditions we derive below are both necessary and sufficient, and
the solution is unique. Note also that existence is guaranteed as well, because the constraint
set is compact. This requires B to be bounded, which we establish below.
Using the ideas of Marcet and Marimon (2011), we can write the Lagrangian in the form
L =
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt Pr
(
st
){ 2∑
i=1
[
Mi
(
st
)
u
(
ci
(
st
))− µi (st)Uaui (st)]
+γ
(
st
)( 2∑
i=1
(
yi (st)− ci
(
st
))
+ (1 + r)B
(
st−1
)−B (st))} ,
where Mi (st) = Mi (st−1) + µi (st) and Mi (s0) = λi. The first-order condition with respect
to agent i’s consumption when history st has occurred is
∂L
∂ci (st)
= Mi
(
st
)
u′
(
ci
(
st
))− γ (st) = 0. (5)
Combining such first-order conditions for agent 1 and agent 2, we have
x
(
st
) ≡ M1 (st)
M2 (st)
=
u′ (c2 (st))
u′ (c1 (st))
. (6)
8See also Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006).
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Here x (st) is the temporary Pareto weight of agent 1 relative to agent 2.9 Defining
υi
(
st
)
=
µi (s
t)
Mi (st)
and using the definitions of x (st) and Mi (st), we can obtain the law of motion of x as
x
(
st
)
= x(st−1)
1− υ2 (st)
1− υ1 (st) . (7)
The planner’s Euler inequality, i.e., the optimality condition for B (st), is
γ
(
st
) ≥ β(1 + r)∑
st+1
Pr
(
st+1|st) γ (st+1) , (8)
which, using (5), can also be written as
Mi
(
st
)
u′
(
ci
(
st
)) ≥ β(1 + r)∑
st+1
Pr
(
st+1 | st)Mi (st+1)u′ (ci (st+1)) .
Then, using (6) and (7), the planner’s Euler becomes
u′
(
ci
(
st
)) ≥ β(1 + r)∑
st+1
Pr
(
st+1|st) u′ (ci (st+1))
1− υi (st+1) , (9)
where 0 ≤ υi (st+1) ≤ 1, ∀st+1,∀i. Given the definition of υi (st+1) and equation (7), it is easy
to see that (8) represents exactly the same mathematical relationship for both agents.
Equation (9) determines the choice of public storage, B (st). It is clear that, first, the
higher the return on storage is, the more incentive the planner has to store. Second, whenever
risk sharing is not perfect, that is, ci (st+1) varies over st+1 for a given st, the planner has a
precautionary motive for storage, a typical motive for saving in models with (endogenously
or exogenously) incomplete markets. Third, the new term compared to standard models is
1/ (1− υi (st+1)) ≥ 1. This term is strictly bigger than 1 for states when agent i’s participa-
tion constraint is binding. Hence, binding future participation constraints amplify the return
on storage. This is the case because higher storage makes the participation constraints looser
in the future by reducing the relative attractiveness of default. The planner internalizes this
effect when choosing the level of public storage.
Next, we introduce some useful notation and show more precisely the recursive formulation
of our problem. This recursive formulation is going to be the basis for both the analytical
characterization and the numerical solution procedure. Let C() and y denote, respectively,
9To reinforce this interpretation, notice that if no participation constraint binds in history st for either
agent, i.e., µ1 (sτ ) = µ2 (sτ ) = 0 for all subhistories sτ ⊆ st, then x (st) = λ1/λ2, the initial relative Pareto
weight of agent 1.
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the consumption function and current income of agent 1, V() his value function, and B′ the
function determining public assets. The following system is recursive with X = (y,B, x) as
state variables:
x′(X) =
u′ (Y + (1 + r)B − B′(X)− C(X))
u′ (C(X)) (10)
x′(X) = x
1− υ2(X)
1− υ1(X) (11)
u′ (C(X)) ≥ β(1 + r)
∑
y′
Pr
(
y′
) u′ (C(X ′))
1− υ1(X ′) (12)
u (C(X)) + β
∑
y′
Pr
(
y′
)V (X ′) ≥ Uau (y) (13)
u
(
Y + (1 + r)B −B′(X)− C(X))+ β∑
y′
Pr
(
y′
)V (Y − y′,B′(X), 1/x′(X)) ≥ Uau (Y − y) (14)
B′(X) ≥ 0. (15)
The first equation, (10), where we have used the resource constraint to substitute for the
consumption of agent 2, says that the ratio of marginal utilities between the two agents has
to be equal to the current relative Pareto weight. Equation (11) is the law of motion of
the co-state variable, x. Equation (12) is the social planner’s Euler inequality, which we
have derived above. Equations (13) and (14) are the participation constraints of agent 1 and
agent 2, respectively. Finally, equation (15) makes sure that public storage is never negative.
Given the recursive formulation above, and noting that the outside option Uau() is mono-
tone in current income and takes a finite set of values, the solution can be characterized
by a set of state-dependent intervals on the temporary Pareto weight. This is analogous to
the basic model, where public storage is not considered (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012,
for a textbook treatment). The key difference is that these optimal intervals on the relative
Pareto weight depend not only on current endowment realizations but also on B. The fol-
lowing lemma will be useful for specifying the optimal state-dependent intervals, and hence
for characterizing the dynamics of our model.
Lemma 1. C (y˜, B, x˜) = C (yˆ, B, xˆ), B′ (y˜, B, x˜) = B′ (yˆ, B, xˆ), and V (y˜, B, x˜) = V (yˆ, B, xˆ)
for all (y˜, x˜), (yˆ, xˆ) such that x′ (y˜, B, x˜) = x′ (yˆ, B, xˆ). That is, for determining consump-
tions, public storage, and agents’ expected lifetime utilities, the current relative Pareto
weight, x′, is a sufficient statistic for the current income state, yj, and last period’s rela-
tive Pareto weight, x.
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Proof. Once we know x′, equations (10) and (12), which do not depend on x, give consumption
and public assets. Then, the left hand side of (13) gives lifetime utility.
Lemma 1 implies that we can express consumptions, public storage, and agents’ lifetime
utility in terms of accumulated assets and the current Pareto weight. That is, we can write
consumption by agent 1, public assets, and the value function as c(B, x′), B′(B, x′), and
V (B, x′), respectively.
The following conditions define the lower and upper bounds of the optimal intervals in
state yj as a function of B:
V (B, xj(B)) = Uau
(
yj
)
and V
(
B,
1
xj(B)
)
= Uau
(
Y − yj) . (16)
Hence, given the inherited Pareto weight, xt−1, and accumulated assets, B, the updating rule
is
xt =

xj(B) if xt−1 > xj(B)
xt−1 if xt−1 ∈
[
xj(B), xj(B)
]
xj(B) if xt−1 < xj(B)
. (17)
The ratio of marginal utilities is kept constant whenever this does not violate the participation
constraint of either agent. When the participation constraint binds for agent 1, the relative
Pareto weight moves to the lower limit of the optimal interval, just making sure that this
agent is indifferent between staying and defaulting. Similarly, when agent 2’s participation
constraint binds, the relative Pareto weight moves to the upper limit of the optimal interval.
Thereby, it is guaranteed that, ex ante, as much risk sharing as possible is achieved while
satisfying the participation constraints.
Note that, given that the value of autarky is strictly increasing in current income and
the value function is strictly increasing in the current Pareto weight, xj(B) > xj−1(B) and
xj(B) > xj−1(B) for all J ≥ j > 1 and B. It is easy to see that, unless autarky is the only
implementable allocation, we have that xj(B) > xj(B) for some j.
Given the utility function, the income process, r, and B, the intervals for different states
may or may not overlap depending on the discount factor, β. The higher β is, the wider
these intervals are. By a standard folk theorem (Kimball, 1988), for β sufficiently high all
intervals overlap, that is, x1(B) ≥ xJ(B), hence perfect risk sharing is implementable at the
given asset level. At the other extreme, when β is sufficiently low, agents stay in autarky.
As public assets are accumulated (or decumulated) these optimal intervals change. The
intervals are wider when B is higher. This is easy to see from (16). Take the first equality.
The right hand side is independent of B, and the value function on the left hand side is
increasing in both its arguments (available resources and own relative Pareto weight), hence
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as B increases xj(B), the lower limit of the optimal interval in state yj, must decrease.
Similarly, from the second inequality in (16), 1/xj(B) must decrease, hence xj(B), the upper
limit, must increase. Moreover, xj(B) is strictly increasing and xj(B) is strictly decreasing
in B for all j, as long as the length of the j-interval is not zero.
In order to better understand some key characteristics of the dynamics of this model, we
now focus on the case where public storage is constant over time. Then, from the next section,
we study in detail the joint dynamics of consumption dispersion and assets. However, as we
show later, under some conditions the economy will converge (almost surely) to a constant
level of public assets. Below we refer to some key properties introduced here. Note also that
the basic model is a special case of this economy with B′ = B = 0.
It is easy to see that consumption is monotone in the current relative Pareto weight in
the constant assets case as in the basic model, because aggregate resources are constant at
Y + rB∗, where B∗ denotes the constant level of assets. Then, we can implicitly define the
limits of the optimal consumption intervals as
cj (B∗) : xj (B∗) =
u′
(
Y + rB∗ − cj (B∗))
u′
(
cj (B∗)
) and cj (B∗) : xj (B∗) = u′ (Y + rB∗ − cj (B∗))
u′ (cj (B∗))
.
We consider scenarios where the long-run equilibrium is characterized by imperfect risk
sharing. That is, we assume from now on that x1 (B∗) < xJ (B∗), or, equivalently, that
c1 (B∗) < cJ (B∗). We do this both because there is overwhelming evidence from several ap-
plications (households in a village or in the United States, spouses in a household, countries)
about less-than-perfect risk sharing, and because the case of the (unconstrained-)efficient
allocation of constant individual consumptions over time is theoretically not interesting. It
is not difficult to see that for a constant B the law of motion described by (17) implies that,
in the long run, risk sharing arrangements subject to limited commitment are characterized
by a finite set of consumption values determined by the limits of the optimal consumption
intervals. It turns out that considering two scenarios is enough to describe the general pic-
ture: (i) each agent’s participation constraint is binding only when his income is highest, and
(ii) each agent’s participation constraint is binding in more than one state.10 Given this, to
describe the constrained-efficient allocations in these two scenarios, it is sufficient to consider
three income states. Hence, for all our graphical and numerical examples, we set J = 3.
Consider an endowment process where each agent gets yh, ym, or yl units of the consump-
tion good, with yh > ym > yl, with probabilities pih, pim, and pil, respectively. Symmetry
implies that ym = (yh + yl)/2 and pih = pil = (1− pim)/2.
10It will become clear below that assets can only be optimally constant in this case if they are zero.
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Figure 1: Consumption dynamics in the long run with constant assets
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(b) Disjunct intervals
Notes: In panel (a) the interval for state ym overlaps with the intervals for state yh and state yl. In panel
(b) all three state-dependent intervals are disjunct.
Given constant assets, the consumption intervals become wider if either β increases for
a given B∗, as in the basic model, or B∗ increases for a given β. Both changes make au-
tarky less attractive. This is true in the former case because agents put higher weight on
insurance in the future, and in the latter because agents are excluded from the benefits of
more public assets upon default. If partial insurance occurs, there are two possible sce-
narios depending on the level of the discount factor and public assets. For higher levels
of β and/or B∗, cm (B∗) ≥ ch (B∗) > cl (B∗) ≥ cm (B∗). This means that the consumption
interval for state ym overlaps with both the interval associated with state yh and the one
association with state yl. This is the case where each agent’s participation constraint binds
for the highest income level only. Panel (a) in Figure 1 presents an example satisfying these
conditions.
Suppose that the initial consumption level of agent 1 is below ch (B∗). When agent 1 draws
a high income realization (which occurs with probability 1 in the long run), his consumption
jumps to ch (B∗). Then it stays at that level until his income jumps to the lowest level.
At that moment, agent 2’s participation constraint binds, because he has high income, and
consumption of agent 1 drops to cl (B∗). Then we are back to where we started from. A
very similar argument can be used whenever agent 1’s initial consumption is above ch (B∗).
This implies that consumption takes only two values, ch (B∗) and cl (B∗), in the long run.
When consumption changes, it always moves between these two levels, and the past history
of income realizations does not matter. This is the amnesia property of the basic model
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(Kocherlakota, 1996). When state ym occurs after state yh or state yl, the consumption
allocation remains unchanged. That is, consumption does not react at all to this ‘small’
change in income. This is the persistence property of the basic model. Note that consumption
also remains unchanged over time if the sequence (h,m, h) or the sequence (l,m, l) takes place.
The key observation here is that, although individuals face consumption changes over
time, the consumption distribution is time-invariant. In every period, half of the agents
consume ch (B∗) and the other half consume cl (B∗). Finally, note that this happens for any
J as long as c2 (B∗) ≥ cJ (B∗) > c1 (B∗) ≥ cJ−1 (B∗).
For lower levels of β and/or B∗, none of the three intervals overlap, i.e., ch (B∗) >
cm (B∗) > cm (B∗) > cl (B∗). Panel (b) in Figure 1 shows an example of this second case.
When all three intervals are disjunct, consumption takes four values in the long run. Notice
that the participation constraint of agent 1 may bind for both the medium and the high
level of income. That is, whenever his income changes his consumption changes as well, and
similarly for agent 2.
In this second case, in state ym the past history determines which agent’s participation
constraint binds, therefore consumption is Markovian. However, current incomes and the
identity of the agent with a binding participation constraint fully determine the consumption
allocation. The dynamics of consumption exhibit amnesia in this sense here. Further, con-
sumption responds to every income change, hence the persistence property does not manifest
itself.
The key observation for later reference is that the consumption distribution changes be-
tween {cm (B∗) , cm (B∗)} and {cl (B∗) , ch (B∗)}. That is, the cross-sectional distribution of
consumption is different when state ym occurs from when an unequal income state, yh or
yl, occurs. If there are J > 3 income states, the cross-sectional consumption distribution
changes over time whenever c2 (B∗) < cJ (B∗) and c1 (B∗) < cJ−1 (B∗).11
2.2 The dynamics of public assets and the consumption distribution
In general, aggregate consumption varies as (1 + r)B − B′(x′, B) varies over time, which
depends on x′. Hence, an increase in the current relative Pareto weight, in principle, may
imply a sufficiently large decrease in aggregate consumption so that agent 1’s consumption
decreases, unlike in the case where assets and hence aggregate consumption are constant.
11The number of income states and the number of states where a participation constraint binds determine
the possible number of long-run consumption levels, and consequently the persistence property may appear.
Note also that, as we show below, if public assets are allowed to vary, they will not stay constant when the
consumption distribution is changing over time.
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For now we state the intuitive property that c increases in x′ as an assumption.
Assumption 1. If x˜′ > xˆ′ then c (B, x˜′) > c (B, xˆ′), ∀B. That is, consumption by agent 1 is
strictly increasing in his current relative Pareto weight.
Next we continue our characterization under Assumption 1. In particular, we prove Claim 1
and Proposition 1 using this assumption. However, to prove Proposition 1, we only need
Assumption 1 to hold in the case where r is such that assets are constant in the long run.
Afterwards, using the results in Claim 1 and Proposition 1 and the uniqueness of the solution
established above, we prove that the property stated in Assumption 1 holds when assets
converge to a constant level in the long run, see Lemma 2. Further, we verify numerically
that this assumption holds also in the case when public assets are stochastic in the long run.
We can describe the dynamics of the model with similar optimal intervals and updating
rule on consumption as on the relative Pareto weight, as for the constant-asset case, under
Assumption 1. Using (10) we can implicitly define the limits of the optimal intervals on
consumption as
cj(B) : xj(B) =
u′
(
Y + (1 + r)B −B′(xj(B), B)− cj(B))
u′
(
cj(B)
)
and cj(B) : xj(B) =
u′ (Y + (1 + r)B −B′(xj(B), B)− cj(B))
u′ (cj(B))
. (18)
Symmetry implies that cj(B) = Y + (1 + r)B −B′(xj(B), B)− cJ−j+1(B).
The next proposition provides a key property of the aggregate storage decision rule and
characterizes the short-run dynamics of assets. It shows how public storage varies with the
consumption and income distribution.
Claim 1. Under Assumption 1, B′(B, x′) is increasing in x′ for x′ ≥ 1 and B′(B, x′) > 0.
That is, the higher cross-sectional consumption inequality is, the higher public asset accumula-
tion is. Further, B′(yj, B, x) ≥ B′(yk, B, x), ∀(B, x), where j ≥ J/2 + 1, k ≥ J/2, and j > k.
That is, aggregate asset accumulation is increasing with cross-sectional income inequality.
Proof. In Appendix A.
The intuition for Claim 1 is coming from two related observations. Higher inequality in
the current period implies higher expected consumption inequality/risk next period. Under
convex inverse marginal utility, the planner has a higher precautionary motive for saving
whenever she faces more risk tomorrow.12
12Note that with log utility B′ is weakly increasing in x′ ≥ 1, i.e., in cross-sectional consumption inequality,
since 1/u′ is linear in this case, while for CRRA utility functions with a coefficient of relative risk aversion
strictly greater than 1, the empirically more plausible range, 1/u′ is strictly convex, hence B′ is strictly
increasing in x′ ≥ 1.
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We are now ready to characterize the long-run behavior of public assets and the consump-
tion distribution.
Proposition 1. Assume that β is such that agents obtain low risk sharing in the sense that
the consumption distribution is time-varying without public storage.
(i) There exists r1 such that for all r ∈ [−1, r1], public storage is never used in the long
run.
(ii) There exists a strictly positive r2 > r1 such that for all r ∈ (r1, r2), B remains stochastic
but bounded, and the consumption distribution is time-varying in the long run.
(iii) For all r ∈ [r2, 1/β − 1), B converges almost surely to a strictly positive constant, B∗,
which is independent of the initial level of assets, and where the consumption distribu-
tion is time-invariant, but perfect risk sharing is not achieved.
(iv) Whenever r = 1/β − 1, B converges almost surely to a strictly positive constant and
perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing.
If β is such that the consumption distribution is time-invariant without public storage, then
r1 = r2, hence only (i), (iii), and (iv) occur.
Proof. In Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the social planner trades off two effects of
increasing aggregate storage: it is costly as long as β(1 + r) < 1, but less so the higher r
is, and it is beneficial because it reduces consumption dispersion in the future. The level
of public assets chosen just balances these two opposing forces. The relative strength of
these two forces naturally depends on the return on storage, r. When the cross-sectional
consumption distribution is time-varying (case (ii)), the relative strength of the two forces
determining asset accumulation changes over time. This implies that assets cannot settle at
a constant level in this case.
When the return on storage is sufficiently high (case (iii)), assets are accumulated so that
participation constraints are only binding for agents with the highest income in the long run,
and the consumption distribution becomes time-invariant. In this case, there is a unique
constant level of assets, B∗, which exactly balances the trade-off between impatience and
the risk-sharing gains of public storage. Decreasing public assets by a small amount would
decrease future risk sharing more than the gain coming from the decrease in the inefficient
transfer of resources to the future. Finally, in the limiting case of β(1 + r) = 1 (case (iv)),
the planner does not face a trade-off between improving risk sharing and using an inefficient
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intertemporal technology, hence assets are accumulated until the level where full insurance
is enforceable.
We now show that Assumption 1 holds, i.e., that consumption is monotone in the current
relative Pareto weight, in the case where assets converge to a constant level in the long run.
We first show that Claim 1 and Proposition 1 imply that the property stated in Assump-
tion 1 holds. Then, given the uniqueness of the solution, this implies that the solution is
characterized by the property stated in Assumption 1 along the transition as well when r is
such that assets are constant in the long run.
Lemma 2. If x˜′ > xˆ′ then c (B, x˜′) > c (B, xˆ′), ∀B, as long as assets converge to a constant
level in the long run. That is, consumption by agent 1 is strictly increasing in his current
relative Pareto weight.
Proof. In Appendix A.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is the following. As a response to increasing inequality, it cannot
be optimal to increase public storage so much that both agents have lower consumption.
That would contradict the optimal intertemporal smoothing behavior of the planner.13
We illustrate the dynamics of assets in our model on two figures. First, Figure 2 shows the
short-run dynamics of assets in the case where they converge to a constant level in the long
run (case (iii) of Proposition 1). We assume that at B0 the participation constraint binds
only when an agent has the highest possible income. The solid line represents B′
(
B, xJ(B)
)
,
i.e., we compute B′ assuming that the relevant participation constraint is binding. It is
easy to see from the figure that at B = B∗ assets remain constant in the long run, since
B′ = B = B∗.
Now, we explain how assets converge to B∗. Suppose that state yJ occurs when inherited
assets are at the initial level B0 < B∗. Then public storage is B′
(
B0, x
J(B0)
)
. Next period,
if any state yj with j ≥ 2 occurs, no participation constraint is binding, hence, according
to Claim 1, assets are B′
(
B, xJ (B0)
)
> B′
(
B, xJ (B)
)
, because given B > B0 we have
xJ (B) < xJ (B0). The dynamics of assets in states yj with j ≥ 2, i.e., when no participation
13Note that the analytical proof can be extended to some values of r which imply that assets are stochastic
in the long run, in particular, values which are close to the threshold above which assets are constant in
the long run or to the threshold below which zero public storage is optimal. Consider an r < r2 in a small
neighborhood of r2 from Proposition 1, the threshold above which assets are constant in the long run. Since
c is strictly increasing in x′ for r2, c must be at least weakly increasing in x′ for r sufficiently close to r2 by
continuity. Then we know that in the previous period c is strictly increasing in x′. Now if the original B is
part of the stationary distribution, then it will occur other times as well, so c must be strictly increasing in x′
there too. Similarly, we can consider r > r1 in a small neighborhood of r1 from Proposition 1, the threshold
below which zero public storage is optimal.
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Figure 2: Short-run asset dynamics when assets are constant in the long run
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constraint binds, is represented by the dot-dashed line. As long as state y1 does not occur,
assets are determined by this line and would eventually converge to the level B˜ > B∗.
However, state y1 occurs almost surely before B˜ is reached. If the level of assets when y1
occurs is above B∗, then assets are determined by the solid line, and they have to decrease.
If a participation constraint continues to bind, which happens in both state y1 and state yJ ,
assets converge to B∗ along the solid line. If no participation constraint binds, then assets
decrease even more, according to Claim 1. This may result in the asset level dropping below
B∗. Then the same dynamics start again but in a tighter neighborhood around B∗. This
argument implies that, although almost-sure convergence is guaranteed, it does not happen
in a monotone way generically.
Figure 3 illustrates both the short- and long-run dynamics of public assets in the case
where they are stochastic in the long run. For simplicity, we consider three income states. We
have generated the figure numerically and verified that Assumption 1 holds. This means that
there are two types of states: two with high income and consumption inequality (states yh
and yl) and one with low income and consumption inequality (state ym). The solid line
represents B′
(
B, xh(B)
)
, i.e., storage in state yh (or yl) when the relevant participation
constraint is binding. Similarly, the dot-dashed line represents B′ (B, xm(B)), i.e., storage in
state ym when the relevant participation constraint is binding. Starting from B0, if state ym
occurs repeatedly, assets converge to the lower limit of their stationary distribution, denoted
B. The relevant participation constraint is always binding along this path, because inherited
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assets keep decreasing.
The dashed line represents the scenario where state yh (or state yl) occurs when inherited
assets are at the lower limit of the stationary distribution, B, and then the same state occurs
repeatedly. This is when assets approach the upper limit of their stationary distribution, de-
noted B. The relevant participation constraint is not binding from the period after the switch
to yh, therefore storage given inherited assets is described by the function B′
(
B, xh(B)
)
.
Under Assumption 1 we can also characterize analytically the limits of the long-run sta-
tionary distribution of assets as follows.
Claim 2. Under Assumption 1, the lower limit of the stationary distribution of public assets,
B, is either strictly positive and is implicitly given by
u′ (cm (B)) = β(1 + r)
J∑
j=1
pij
u′ (C (yj, B, xm (B)))
1− υ1 (yj, B, xm (B)) , (19)
or is zero and (19) holds as strict inequality. The upper limit of the stationary distribution
of public assets, B, is implicitly given by
u′
(C (yJ , B, xJ (B))) = β(1 + r) J∑
j=1
piju′
(C (yj, B, xJ (B))) . (20)
Proof. In Appendix A.
Finally, assume, without loss of generality, that state yl occurred many times while ap-
proaching B, and suppose that state yh occurs when inherited assets are (close to) B. In
this case, x′ = xh
(
B
)
< xh (B), and assets decrease. They then converge to a level B˜ from
above with the relevant participation constraint binding along this path. The same happens
whenever B > B˜ when we switch to state yh (or yl). B˜ is implicitly given by
u′
(
ch
(
B˜
))
= β(1 + r)
∑
j={l,m,h}
piju′
(
C
(
yj, B˜, xh
(
B˜
)))
.
Note that as long as only state yh and yl occur, assets remain constant at B˜, similarly as
in the previous figure. The key difference is that when the income distribution switches to
the most equal one (ym), a participation constraint binds, triggering a move in x toward 1,
hence assets drop according to Claim 1.
2.3 The dynamics of individual consumptions
Having characterized assets, we now turn to the dynamics of consumption. One key property
of the basic model is that whenever either agent’s participation constraint binds (υ1(X) > 0
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Figure 3: Asset dynamics when assets are stochastic in the long run
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or υ2(X) > 0), the resulting allocation is independent of the preceding history. In our for-
mulation, this implies that x′ is only a function of yj and the identity of the agent with a
binding participation constraint. This is often called the amnesia property (Kocherlakota,
1996). See further our discussion in Section 2.1. Typically data do not support this pattern,
see Broer (2013) for the United States and Kinnan (2012) for Thai villages. Allowing for
storage helps to bring the model closer to the data in this respect.
Proposition 2. The amnesia property does not hold when public assets are stochastic in the
long run.
Proof. x′ and hence current consumption depend on both current income and inherited
assets, B, when a participation constraint binds. This implies that the past history of income
realizations affects current consumptions through B.
Another property of the basic model is that whenever neither participation constraint
binds (υ1(X) = υ2(X) = 0), the consumption allocation is constant and hence exhibits an
extreme form of persistence. This can be seen easily: (11) gives x′ = x, and the consumption
allocation is only a function of x′ with constant aggregate income. This implies that for
‘small’ income changes which do not trigger a participation constraint to bind, we do not
see any change in individual consumptions. It is again not easy to find evidence for this
pattern in the data, see Broer (2013). In our model, even if the relative Pareto weight
does not change, (10) does not imply that individual consumptions will be the same next
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period as in the current period. This is because (1 + r)B − B′(X) is generically not equal to
(1 + r)B′ − B′′(X ′) when assets are stochastic in the long run.14
Proposition 3. The persistence property does not hold generically when public assets are
stochastic in the long run.
Proof. Even though x′ = x, when neither participation constraint binds, consumption is only
constant if net savings are identical in the past and the current period. This is generically
not the case when B is stochastic.
The last two propositions imply that in the our model the dynamics of consumption are
richer and closer to the data than in the basic model in a qualitative sense. We leave the
study of the quantitative implications of storage on consumption dynamics to future work.
2.4 Welfare
It is clear that access to public storage cannot reduce welfare, because zero assets can always
be chosen. Along the same lines, if public storage is strictly positive for at least the most
unequal income state, then welfare strictly improves. Proposition 1 implies that this is the
case whenever the basic model does not display perfect risk sharing and the return on storage
is higher than r1 < 1/β − 1.
2.5 Decentralization
Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2006) show how to decentralize a limited-commitment econ-
omy with capital accumulation and production. That economy is similar to the current one in
one important aspect: agents are excluded from receiving capital income after default. They
introduce competitive intermediaries and show that a decentralization with endogenous debt
constraints which are ‘not too tight’ (which make the agents just indifferent between partic-
ipating and defaulting), as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), is possible.15 However, Ábrahám
and Cárceles-Poveda (2006) use a neoclassical production function where wages depend on
aggregate capital. This implies that there the value of autarky depends on aggregate capi-
tal as well.16 They show that if the intermediaries are subject to endogenously determined
14The only exceptions are asset levels B, B˜, and B in Figure 3 with the appropriate income states occurring.
However, the probability that assets settle at these points in the stationary distribution is zero.
15Note that this holds as long as the implied interest rate is ‘high,’ see Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
16This is also the case in the two-country production economy of Kehoe and Perri (2004).
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capital accumulation constraints, then this externality can be taken into account, and the
constrained-efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.17
Public storage can be thought of as a form of capital, B units of which produce
Y + (1 + r)B units of output tomorrow and which fully depreciates. Hence, the results above
directly imply that a competitive equilibrium corresponding to the constrained-efficient allo-
cation exists. In particular, households trade Arrow securities subject to endogenous borrow-
ing constraints which prevent default, and the intermediaries also sell these Arrow securities
to build up public storage. The key intuition is that equilibrium Arrow security prices take
into account binding future participation constraints, as these prices are given by the usual
pricing kernel. Moreover, agents do not hold any ‘shares’ in public storage, hence their
autarky value is not affected. Finally, no arbitrage or perfect competition guarantees that
the intermediaries make zero profits in equilibrium. As opposed to Ábrahám and Cárceles-
Poveda (2006), capital accumulation constraints are not necessary, because in our model
public storage does not affect agents’ outside option.
3 The model with both public and private storage
So far we have assumed that storage is available to the social planner, but agents can use it
neither in autarky nor while in the risk sharing arrangement. In this section, we allow agents
to use the same storage technology as the social planner. Access to storage both affects
agents’ autarky value and enlarges the set of possible actions and deviations. In practice,
allowing for private storage requires adding agents’ Euler inequalities as constraints to the
problem given by the objective function (1) and the constraints (2) and (3), and modifying
the participation constraints, (3).
The social planner’s problem becomes
max
{ci(st),B(st)}
2∑
i=1
λi
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt Pr
(
st
)
u
(
ci
(
st
))
(21)
s.t.
2∑
i=1
ci
(
st
) ≤ 2∑
i=1
yi (st) + (1 + r)B
(
st−1
)−B (st) , B (st) ≥ 0, ∀st, (22)
(P1 )
∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
βr−t Pr
(
sr | st)u (ci (sr)) ≥ U˜aui (st) , ∀st,∀i, (23)
u′
(
ci
(
st
)) ≥ β(1 + r)∑
st+1
Pr
(
st+1 | st)u′ (ci (st+1)) , ∀st, ∀i. (24)
17Chien and Lee (2010) achieve the same objective by taxing capital instead of using a capital accumulation
constraint.
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The objective function, the resource constraint, and the non-negativity of storage restriction
remain the same as before. The participation constraints, (23), change slightly, since U˜aui (st)
(to be defined precisely below) is the value function of autarky when storage is allowed.
Agents’ Euler inequalities, equation (24), guarantee that agents have no incentive to deviate
from the proposed allocation by storing privately. Note that we implicitly assume that private
storage is zero at the initial period.
A few remarks are in order about this structure before we turn to the characterization of
constrained-efficient allocations. First, agents can store in autarky, but they lose access to
the benefits of the public asset.18 This implies that U˜aui (yj) = V aui (yj, 0), where V aui (yj, b)
is defined as
V aui
(
yj, b
)
= max
b′
{
u(yj + (1 + r)b− b′) + β
J∑
k=1
pikV aui
(
yk, b′
)}
, (25)
where b denotes private savings. Since V aui (yj, 0) is increasing (decreasing) in j for agent 1
(2), it is obvious that if we replace the autarky value in the model of Section 2 (or in the
basic model) with the one defined here, the same characterization holds. Note that, unlike
in Bulow and Rogoff (1989), state-contingent assets are not available in autarky.19
Second, we use a version of the first-order-condition approach (FOCA) here. That is,
these constraints only cover a subset of possible deviations. In particular, we verify that
the agent is better off staying in the risk arrangement rather than defaulting and possibly
storing (constraint (23), see also (25)), and that he has no incentive to store given that he
does not ever default (constraint (24), agents’ consumption-saving optimality condition). It
is not obvious whether these constraints are sufficient to guarantee incentive compatibility,
because multiple and multi-period deviations are not considered by these constraints.20 In
particular, an agent can store in the current period to increase his value of autarky in future
periods and default in a later period. For now, we assume that these deviations are not
profitable given the contract which solves Problem P1. We characterize the solution under
this assumption. Then, in Appendix C we provide a numerical verification algorithm to show
that agents indeed have no incentive to use these more complex deviations, unless the return
on the storage technology is in a small neighborhood of the efficient level.
18This is the same assumption as in Krueger and Perri (2006), where agents lose access to the benefits of
a tree after defaulting. In our model the tree is endogenous.
19Bulow and Rogoff (1989) find that access to state-contingent “cash-in-advance contracts” in autarky
prevents risk sharing in equilibrium. However, “[t]his conclusion does depend on a sovereign’s ability to
reproduce any risk-sharing advantages of loan contracts by holding a portfolio of foreign assets” (p. 49).
20In fact, Kocherlakota (2004) shows that in an economy with private information and hidden storage the
first-order-condition approach can be invalid.
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Third, both the participation constraints, (23), and the Euler constraints, (24), involve
future decision variables. Given these two types of forward-looking constraints, a recursive
formulation using either the promised-utility approach (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1990)
or the recursive-Lagrangian approach (Marcet and Marimon, 2011) is difficult. Euler con-
straints have been dealt with using the agent’s marginal utility as a co-state variable in
models with moral hazard and hidden storage, see Werning (2001) and Ábrahám and Pavoni
(2008). In our environment, this could raise serious tractability issues, since we would need
two more continuous co-state variables, in addition to the co-state variable which makes the
participation constraints recursive.
In this paper, we follow a different approach that avoids these complications. In particular,
we show that the solution of a simplified problem where agents’ Euler inequalities are ignored
satisfies those Euler constraints. That is, instead of Problem P1, we consider the following
simpler problem:
max
{ci(st),B(st)}
2∑
i=1
λi
∞∑
t=1
∑
st
βt Pr
(
st
)
u
(
ci
(
st
))
(P2 ) s.t.
2∑
i=1
ci
(
st
) ≤ 2∑
i=1
yi (st) + (1 + r)B
(
st−1
)−B (st) , B (st) ≥ 0, ∀st,
∞∑
r=t
∑
sr
βr−t Pr
(
sr | st)u (ci (sr)) ≥ U˜aui (st) , ∀st,∀i.
This is the problem we studied in Section 2, the only difference being that the autarky value
is different. Now, we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 4. The solution of the model with hidden storage, P1, corresponds to the solu-
tion of the simplified problem, P2.
Proof. We prove this proposition by showing that the allocation which solves P2 satisfies
agents’ Euler inequalities (24), the only additional constraints. Note that the planner’s
Euler, (9), is a necessary condition for optimality for P2. It is clear that the right hand side
of (9) is bigger than the right hand side of (24), for i = {1, 2}, since 0 ≤ υi (st+1) ≤ 1, ∀st+1.
Therefore, (9) implies (24).
This result implies that the characteristics of the constrained-efficient allocations of Prob-
lem P1 are the same as those of Problem P2, which is the problem we studied in Section 2.
Proposition 4 also means that private storage does not matter as long as public asset accu-
mulation is optimal. We have to emphasize, however, that the result that no private storage
occurs hinges on the assumption of optimal public asset accumulation with the same return.
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The intuition behind this result is that the planner has more incentive to store than
the agents. She stores for the agents, because she inherits their consumption smoothing
preferences. Thereby she can eliminate the agents’ incentive to store in a hidden way. Fur-
ther, comparing (9) and (24) again, it is obvious that the planner has more incentive to
store than the agents in all but the most unequal states. In particular, the presence of
1/ (1− υi (st+1)) > 1 in the planner’s Euler indicates how public asset accumulation helps
the planner to relax future participation constraints, and thereby improve risk sharing, or,
make markets more complete. In other words, the planner internalizes the positive externality
of public asset accumulation on future risk sharing.
Next, we relate the case with both private and public storage to the case with private
storage in autarky but without public storage. The following result follows from Proposi-
tion 4.
Corollary 1. The planner stores in equilibrium whenever an agent’s Euler inequality is
violated at the constrained-efficient allocation of the basic model with no public storage and
private storage only in autarky.
Corollary 1 says that whenever agents have private storage incentives in the basic model,
public storage is used in equilibrium. However, this result is only interesting if private
storage matters, i.e., agents’ Euler inequalities are violated, in the basic model under general
conditions. This is what we establish next.
3.1 Does hidden storage matter in the basic model?
In this section, we identify conditions under which agents would store at the constrained-
efficient solution of the basic model without public storage. We assume that partial insurance
occurs at the solution, because otherwise it is trivial that private storage is never used. If
agents’ Euler inequalities are violated, the solution is not robust to deviations when private
storage is available. Further, Corollary 1 implies that public storage is going to be strictly
positive, at least under some histories, whenever this technology is available.
We first consider the benchmark case where agents have access to an efficient intertempo-
ral technology, i.e., storage earns a return r such that β(1 + r) = 1. Afterwards, we study the
general case. We only examine whether agents would use the available hidden intertemporal
technology at the constrained-efficient allocation of the basic model. We do not make any
assumption about the number of income states, except that income may take a finite number
of values and the support of the income distribution is bounded.
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Lemma 3. Suppose that partial insurance occurs and the hidden storage technology yields a
return r such that β(1 + r) = 1. Then agents’ Euler inequalities are violated at the constrained-
efficient allocation of the basic model.
Proof. We show that the Euler inequality is violated at the constrained-efficient allocation
at least when an agent receives the highest possible income, yJ , hence his participation
constraint is binding. By the characterization in Section 2.1, it is clear that for all fu-
ture income levels his consumption will be no greater than his current consumption, i.e.,
C (yj, 0, xJ(0)) ≤ cJ(0). If partial insurance occurs, then it must be that there exists some
state yk where the agent consumes C (yk, 0, xJ) < cJ(0). Then,
u′(cJ(0)) <
∑
yj
piju′
(C (yj, 0, xJ(0))) ,
that is, the Euler inequality is violated.
It is obvious that if the return on storage is low, the constrained-efficient allocation of
the basic model satisfies agents’ Euler inequalities. The following proposition shows that for
all economies with partial insurance one can find a threshold return on storage above which
agents’ storage incentives bind in the basic model.
Proposition 5. There exists r˜ < 1/β − 1 such that for all r > r˜ agents’ Euler inequalities
are violated at the constrained-efficient allocation of the basic model.
Proof. r˜ is defined as the solution to
u′(cJ(0)) = β(1 + r˜)
∑
yj
Pr
(
yj
)
u′
(C (yj, 0, xJ(0))) . (26)
For r˜ close to −1, the right hand side is close to zero. For r˜ = 1/β − 1, the right hand side
is greater than the left hand side by Lemma 3. It is obvious that the right hand side is
continuous and increasing in r˜. Therefore, there is a unique r˜ that solves equation (26), and
agents’ Euler inequalities are violated for higher values of r.
The intuition behind this result is that whenever partial insurance occurs, the agent
enjoying high consumption in the current period faces a weakly decreasing consumption
path. Therefore, if a storage technology with sufficiently high return is available, the agent
uses it for self-insurance purposes. We can also show that the threshold r˜ in Proposition 5
can be negative. In particular, we have shown that agents would use a storage technology
with r = 0 under non-restrictive conditions. A necessary condition is that the consumption
distribution is time-varying in the long run. The proofs of these results are available upon
request.
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3.2 The dynamics of individual consumptions revisited
We have shown in Section 2.3 that, introducing public storage, we overturn two counterfac-
tual properties of consumption dynamics in the basic model, the amnesia and persistence
properties. We can improve on the basic model with respect to a third aspect of the dy-
namics of consumption. In particular, the Euler inequality cannot be rejected in household
survey data from developed economies, once household demographics and labor supply are
appropriately accounted for (see Attanasio, 1999, for a comprehensive review of the litera-
ture). Since in our model with public storage agents’ Euler inequalities are satisfied, while
they are violated in the basic model, we bring limited commitment models in line with this
third observation as well.
Would other extensions of the basic model yield the same three improvements? Two
components are necessary: (i) allowing for storage to make sure that agents’ Euler inequalities
are satisfied, and (ii) an endogenous aggregate variable which makes aggregate consumption
vary without aggregate income changing, for which the natural candidate is aggregate saving.
Hence, ours is the simplest extension to the basic limited commitment framework which
delivers all three properties.
3.3 Welfare revisited
In Section 2.4 we have argued that access to public storage unambiguously reduces consump-
tion dispersion and improves welfare. It is clear that hidden storage counteracts these benefits
of storage, because it increases the value of agents’ outside option, which in itself increases
consumption dispersion and reduces welfare. The overall effects of access to both public and
private storage are hence ambiguous in general, and depend on the return to storage, r. We
first compare welfare at the long-run stationary distribution of our model with both public
and private storage and the basic model without storage. Afterwards, we discuss the effects
of the transition from the moment when storage becomes available.
In the following proposition we compare consumption dispersion and (equal-weighted)
social welfare in the long-run steady state in two economies. In the first economy neither
public nor private storage is available, in the second one both are available. We assume that
some risk sharing occurs both with and without access to storage for all r.
Proposition 6.
(i) There exists r˜1 such that for all r ∈ [−1, r˜1] storage is not used even in autarky, therefore
access to storage leaves consumption dispersion unchanged and is welfare neutral.
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(ii) There exists r˜2 > r˜1 such that for all r ∈ (r˜1, r˜2] storage is used in autarky but not in
equilibrium, therefore consumption dispersion increases and welfare deteriorates as a
result of access to storage, and strictly so as long as perfect risk sharing is not self-
enforcing.
(iii) There exists r˜3 > r˜2 such that for all r ∈ (r˜2, r˜3) public storage is (at least sometimes)
strictly positive, but access to storage is still welfare reducing and consumption disper-
sion is higher than in the basic model without storage. Access to storage is welfare
neutral in the long run at the threshold r = r˜3.
(iv) There exists r˜4 > r˜3 such that for all r ∈ (r˜3, r˜4) access to storage is welfare improving
in the long run, but consumption dispersion is still higher than in the basic model.
Consumption dispersion is the same at the threshold r = r˜4.
(v) For all r ∈ (r˜4, 1/β − 1] access to storage is welfare improving in the long run, and
consumption dispersion is lower than in the basic model.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Even when welfare improves in the long run, accumulating public assets has short-run
costs in terms of reduced aggregate consumption. This implies that the total gains (losses)
from gaining access to storage are lower (higher) than those we have considered in Proposi-
tion 6. However, it is not clear whether access to both private and public storage improves
welfare. For this reason, we explore this issue using numerical examples in the next section.
4 Computed examples
In this section we solve for the constrained-efficient allocation in economies with limited
commitment and access to public and private storage. As in Section 3, agents are allowed to
store in autarky. We describe the algorithm we have applied in more detail in Appendix B.
We show that aggregate storage can be significant in magnitude. We also illustrate how risk
sharing, welfare, and the dynamics of consumption are affected by the availability of storage
with different returns −1 ≤ r < 1/β − 1.21
We assume that agents’ per-period utility function is of the CRRA form with a coefficient
of relative risk aversion equal to 1, i.e., u() = ln(). We assume that the income of both
agents is i.i.d. over time and may take three values, with equal probabilities. We normalize
aggregate income to 1, hence the middle income realization ym = 0.5. We choose the high
21For r = 1/β − 1, the first-order-condition approach may be invalid, see Appendix C, hence we focus on
the case of an inefficient storage technology.
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and low income values to match the coefficient of variation of households’ income in village
economies. In particular, we use data from three Indian villages collected by the International
Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).22 We find that the median
coefficient of variation of households’ income is 0.294. Hence, the income values are 0.353,
0.5, and 0.647.
We consider two discount factors, low (β = 0.85) and high (β = 0.9). In the former
case risk sharing is partial without storage, however, the consumption distribution is time-
invariant (i.e., the participation constraint of each agent binds only for the highest income
level). In the latter case, perfect risk sharing occurs without access to storage. Note that
this does not imply that public and private storage cannot be relevant as access to private
storage increases the autarky values and may prevent full insurance with zero public assets.
This triggers public asset accumulation if the return on storage is sufficiently high.
We present the simulation results on a few figures. First, let us look at the behavior of
assets in the long run. Figure 4 shows the stationary distribution of assets, the first panel for
β = 0.85 and the second for β = 0.9. Note the difference in scales in the two panels. Assets
in the long run naturally increase with r. When the discount factor is high (β = 0.9), the
participation constraints in state ym do not bind in the long run, and assets always converge
to a constant for any return on storage (case (iii) in Proposition 1). Public storage is strictly
positive for r > 0.041. For example, with r = 0.06 the planner’s savings amount to 6.85
percent of aggregate (non-asset) income, with r = 0.08 they are 12.37 percent, and with
r = 0.11 they are at least 22.59 percent.
When β = 0.85, for intermediate values of r the participation constraints bind in all three
states, and assets remain stochastic in the long run (case (ii) in Proposition 1). Public storage
is (sometimes) strictly positive for r > 0.033. For example, with r = 0.07 public assets vary
between 4.51 and 5.32 percent of aggregate (non-asset) income. When the interest rate is
r = 0.4, assets vary between 0 and 1.85 percent. This last example shows that 0 can be part
of the stationary distribution of assets when they are stochastic in the long run (see Claim 2).
With r = 0.176 public storage reaches at least 22.03 percent of income (not shown on the
figure).
Figure 5 shows the possible long-run consumption values. Together with Figure 4, this
figure reflects the different cases described in Propositions 1 and 6. If β = 0.85 (β = 0.9) for
returns below r˜1 = −0.143 (r˜1 = −0.192) storage does not even affect the value of autarky
22It is safe to say that it is the most widely-used income-consumption survey from developing countries. In
particular, the ICRISAT dataset has been used by many papers studying risk sharing in village economies,
including Townsend (1994), Ligon (1998), Ogaki and Zhang (2001), Ligon et al. (2002), Mazzocco and Saini
(2012), and Laczó (2014).
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Figure 4: Assets in the long run
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Notes: The stationary distribution of public assets. The aggregate endowment is 1 in each period. Note the
difference in scales in the two panels.
and hence it is not used in equilibrium either. In this case, the allocation is not affected by
the availability of storage. Given our parameterization, this implies that in the low patience
case (β = 0.85) the consumption distribution has two values, while in the high patience case
(β = 0.9) full risk sharing is enforceable. In fact, for β = 0.9, perfect risk sharing occurs
in the long run for r ≤ −0.104, since the participations constraints still do not bind in the
rage −0.192 < r ≤ −0.104. As long as r is below r˜2 = 0.033 (r˜2 = 0.041) for β low (high),
public storage is still not used, but storage increases the value of autarky, so consumption
dispersion increases with the rate of return on storage.23 For r ≥ r˜2, as r and aggregate asset
accumulation increases, consumption dispersion declines.
One important difference between the two cases is that with the lower β at r = −0.024 the
autarky values become such that a participation constraint binds in state ym as well. For this
reason, in Panel (a) of Figure 5, we see four consumption levels (as in Panel (b) of Figure 1)
as long as public storage is not used. As the return reaches r1 = r˜2 = 0.033 public storage is
used, and assets remain stochastic in the long run until r2 = 0.094 (case (ii) in Proposition 1).
This implies that in this case, even in the long run, consumptions not only depend on current
income but also on the changing level of assets. Panel (a) of Figure 5 also shows that the
stochasticity of assets has small effects on the levels and dispersion of consumption in this
example. At r = 0.094 the participation constraints stop binding in state ym, and hence the
consumption distribution becomes time-invariant and assets converge to a constant level.
23For β = 0.9, the autarky value is affected already for a lower storage return, however at these levels full
insurance is still enforceable.
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Figure 5: Consumption in the long run
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Notes: The stationary distribution of consumption. For β = 0.9, assets are never stochastic in the long run
and consumption may take two values at most for all r. Note the difference in scales in the two panels.
Figure 6 shows long-run welfare expressed in per-period consumption equivalents. We
have characterized long-run welfare in Proposition 6. When storage only increases the value
of autarky, it decreases welfare. However, when the return is high enough so that it is used
by the planner in equilibrium, it may increase welfare in the long run. When β = 0.85
the threshold return above which long-run welfare improves is r˜3 = 0.070, when β = 0.9 it
is 0.054. Note that at these thresholds, consumption dispersion is higher than in the case
without storage, however aggregate consumption is also higher. As the return on storage
approaches the efficient level, consumption dispersion approaches zero, hence welfare is always
higher with than without storage in the long run. The welfare gain for r close to the discount
rate is approximately equal to a 4.3 percent increase in consumption when β = 0.85, and to
a 2.5 percent increase when β = 0.9.
Finally, we compute average welfare from the moment the storage technology becomes
available. We do this to take into account the costs of asset accumulation. Figure 7 shows
the results. In these two examples, access to both public and private storage lowers welfare
for all r. The reason is that there are large welfare costs associated with the build-up of
aggregate assets, and in our two examples these costs dominate the long-run gains. It is
not clear how general this result is, and we leave this investigation to future work due to
high computational costs. We know, however, that if perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing
without private storage (as with β = 0.9), public storage is never positive even when it is
available. This implies that when we allow for private storage, the feasible set shrinks, and
hence welfare deteriorates. Panel (b) of Figure 7 confirms this. With β = 0.85 risk sharing is
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Figure 6: Welfare in the long run
−0.15 −0.1 −0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15
0.495
0.5
0.505
0.51
0.515
0.52
r
we
lfa
re
(a) β = 0.85
−0.1 −0.05 0 0.05 0.1
0.498
0.5
0.502
0.504
0.506
0.508
0.51
0.512
r
we
lfa
re
(b) β = 0.9
Notes: The solid line shows long-run welfare per period in consumption-equivalent terms with both public
and private storage. The dashed line shows long-run welfare per period in consumption-equivalent terms
without storage for reference. Note the difference in scales in the two panels.
partial without private storage. Here, public storage would be used and would surely improve
welfare if private storage were not allowed. However, private storage reduces risk sharing by
improving the outside options of agents. Hence, the overall effect could go either way. We
do not see these results as a case against improving storage technologies. If we take hidden
private storage unavoidable, then our results indicate that public storage certainly improves
welfare.
Figure 7: Welfare including transition
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Notes: The solid line shows expected lifetime utility in per-period consumption-equivalent terms from the
moment when (both public and private) storage becomes available. The dashed line shows expected lifetime
utility in per-period consumption-equivalent terms without storage for reference. Note the difference in scales
in the two panels.
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5 Summary and discussion
This paper has shown that some implications of the basic risk sharing with limited commit-
ment model with no private or public storage are not robust to hidden storage. When public
storage is allowed though, the incentive for private storage is eliminated in the constrained-
efficient allocation. The intertemporal technology is used in equilibrium even though the
aggregate endowment is constant and the return is lower than the discount rate. Further,
when income inequality is not the highest, the planner has more incentive to store than the
agents. The reason for additional storage by the planner is that public assets relax future
participation constraints and hence improve risk sharing.
The effects of the availability of both public and private storage on asset accumulation,
consumption dispersion, and welfare depend on its return. In the long run, (i) for low r,
access to storage is welfare neutral, because it is not used, hence we are back to the basic
model of Kocherlakota (1996); (ii) for higher r, storage happens only in autarky, therefore,
consumption dispersion increases and welfare decreases, but storage does not matter other-
wise; (iii) for yet higher r, hidden storage matters in equilibrium in the basic model, public
storage is (sometimes) strictly positive, stochastic, and depends positively on consumption
inequality (as long as inverse marginal utility is convex), the consumption distribution is
time-varying, and many consumption values occur;24 (iv) for yet higher r, public storage be-
comes positive and constant in the long run, and only two consumption levels occur, i.e., the
consumption distribution is time-invariant; (v) for r = 1/β − 1, public storage is positive and
constant, and perfect risk sharing occurs. Long-run welfare improves above some threshold
return, which is less than the discount rate. At the same time, there are short-run costs
to accumulating assets. However, given access to private storage, public asset accumulation
always reduces consumption dispersion and improves welfare.
The dynamics of individual consumptions are richer in our model compared to the basic
model when assets are stochastic in the long run. In particular, the amnesia and persistence
properties do not hold in general, which brings limited commitment models closer to the data
(Broer, 2013). Further, in our model agents’ Euler inequalities hold, which is consistent with
empirical evidence from developed countries (Attanasio, 1999).
Comparing our model with limited commitment and storage to models with hidden income
or effort and storage (Allen, 1985; Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001; Ábrahám, Koehne, and
Pavoni, 2011) points to some similarities and remarkable differences. In both models, hidden
storage reduces welfare by imposing tighter constraints on risk sharing. In private information
24This third case only occurs for some set of parameter values.
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models, public storage cannot mitigate this effect and hence is never used in equilibrium. In
contrast, in our model public storage is used in equilibrium and welfare improves if its return
is sufficiently high. This is because with limited commitment as the deep friction storage by
the planner relaxes the incentive problem, by relaxing future participation constraints, while
in the hidden income/effort context aggregate asset accumulation makes incentive provision
for truthful revelation more expensive.
Throughout the analysis, we have restricted our attention to a model without aggregate
risk. We have done this on purpose to isolate the pure effect of limited commitment on asset
accumulation from other motives such as aggregate consumption smoothing. However, we
expect our key results to hold with aggregate income uncertainty as well. Clearly, if the
return on storage is high enough, public assets would fluctuate even at the first best. It is
well known from the literature with exogenous incomplete markets (Huggett, 1993, Aiyagari,
1994), that assets are bounded as long as β(1+r) < 1.25 This implies that when one combines
aggregate income risk and limited commitment, assets will be stochastic and bounded in the
long run.
The main mechanism of our paper would operate in a very similar way in the presence of
aggregate risk. In fact, the key equation determining public asset accumulation, the planner’s
Euler equation, (9), would remain the same with the only difference that the histories would
include the realizations of the aggregate shock as well. This also means that, as in our
model without aggregate risk, the introduction of public storage relaxes the market friction,
unlike in incomplete market models with asymmetric information (Cole and Kocherlakota,
2001). Further, if aggregate income is uncorrelated with cross-sectional income inequality,
this implies that compared to the first best the constrained-efficient allocation would exhibit
more asset accumulation, as it is not only helpful for aggregate consumption smoothing
but also for reducing future consumption inequality, as in our model without aggregate
risk. If higher aggregate income is correlated with lower cross-sectional income inequality, a
potentially empirically relevant case, the two forces determining aggregate asset accumulation
go in opposite directions, and we would expect smoother asset behavior than at the first best.
As both the private and public Euler equations remain virtually unchanged, introduction
of aggregate risk would not affect another key result either: public storage preempts private
storage in equilibrium. This result is particularly useful for solving the model numerically,
which would therefore be without difficulty in the presence of aggregate risk in quantitative
applications. In terms of welfare, as storage has an intrinsic value even without the limited-
25It would not be the case under β(1 + r) = 1, hence we would expect assets to diverge with limited
commitment as well.
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commitment friction in this case, we expect that, even though private storage alone reduces
welfare, overall the positive effect of public storage could offset these welfare losses. The
higher aggregate risk is, the more likely this is to be the case.
Our model could be applied in several economic contexts. The model predicts that risk
sharing among households in villages can be improved by a public grain storage facility. Our
model also provides a rationale for marriage contracts to specify that some commonly held
assets are lost by the spouse who files for divorce. Finally, supranational organizations may
help international risk sharing by simply having a jointly held stock of assets. The European
Stability Mechanism may serve this purpose. Future work should study the quantitative
implications of storage using some of these applications.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Claim 1. We consider three income states for expositional reasons. Generalizing
the proof to more income states is straightforward. Assume indirectly that B′ (B, x˜′) =
B′ (B, xˆ′) ≡ B′.26 This assumption and (10) imply that u′ (c (B, x˜′)) < u′ (c (B, xˆ′)).
First, consider x˜′ and xˆ′ such that min
{
xh (B′) , xm (B′)
} ≥ x˜′ > xˆ′ ≥ 1. Let us rewrite
(12) as
1 ≥ β(1 + r)
∑
y′
Pr (y′)
u′ (C (y′, B′, x′))
u′ (c (B, x′)) (1− υ1 (y′, B′, x′)) . (27)
We now detail what happens next period, so that we can compare the right hand side of (27)
for x˜′ and xˆ′.
• If state yh occurs, then the participation constraint of agent 1 is binding. Given that B′
is the same for x˜′ and xˆ′ under our indirect assumption, x′′ will equal xh (B′) and c′ will
equal ch (B′) for both. However, the ratio on the right hand side of (27) differs because
υ1(y
′, B′, x˜′) < υ1(y′, B′, xˆ′). For x′ = {xˆ′, x˜′} we obtain
u′
(
ch(B′)
)
u′ (c (B, x′)) (1− υ1(y′, B′, x′)) =
u′
(
cl(B′)
)
u′ (c2 (B, x′))
.
where we have combined (10) and (11).
• If state ym occurs, then no participation constraint is binding, hence the relative Pareto
weight does not change. For HARA utility functions, it can be shown using simple algebra
that each agent’s marginal utility grows at the rate ((2a+ c′+ c′2)/(2a+ c+ c2))−σ, hence
we know that in this case
u′ (c (B′, x˜′))
u′ (c (B, x˜′))
=
u′ (c (B′, xˆ′))
u′ (c (B, xˆ′))
.
• If state yl occurs, then the participation constraint of agent 2 is binding. Given that B′
is the same for x˜′ and xˆ′, x′′ will equal xl (B′) and c′ will equal cl (B′) for both. Thus for
x′ = {xˆ′, x˜′}, we have
u′
(
cl(B′)
)
u′ (c (B, x′))
.
26If we assume indirectly that B′ (B, x˜′) ≤ B′ (B, xˆ′) for x˜′ > xˆ′ ≥ 1 and B′ (B, x˜′) ≥ B′ (B, xˆ′) for
1 ≥ x˜′ > xˆ, the steps of the proof are the same, but the algebra is more tedious.
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In summary, for x′ = {xˆ′, x˜′} on the right hand side of (27) we have
β(1 + r)
[
pie
u′
(
cl(B′)
)
u′ (c2 (B, x′))
+ pim
u′ (c (B′, x′))
u′ (c (B, x′))
+ pie
u′
(
cl(B′)
)
u′ (c (B, x′))
]
,
where pie = pih = pil. If this expression is greater for x˜′ than for xˆ′, then our indirect
assumption is invalidated and B′ has to be greater for x˜′ than for xˆ′ to satisfy (27). The
second term is the same in the two expressions. Therefore, the sign of the difference is the
sign of
∆1 (B, x˜
′, xˆ′) ≡ 1
u′ (c2 (B, x˜′))
+
1
u′ (c (B, x˜′))
−
(
1
u′ (c2 (B, xˆ′))
+
1
u′ (c (B, xˆ′))
)
.
Given that x˜′ > xˆ′ ≥ 1 implies c2 (B, x˜′) < c2 (B, xˆ′) ≤ c (B, xˆ′) < c (B, x˜′) by Assumption 1,
this difference is (strictly) positive if 1/u′ is (strictly) convex. So under this condition, B′ is
(strictly) increasing in x′ in the case where min
{
xh (B′) , xm (B′)
} ≥ x′ ≥ 1.
Second, consider x˜′ and xˆ′ such that x˜′ > xˆ′ ≥ xm.
• If state yl occurs next period, nothing changes compared to the previous case, where
min
{
xh (B′) , xm (B′)
} ≥ x˜′ > xˆ′ ≥ 1.
• For state ym the difference between the ratio on the right hand side of (27) for x˜′ and xˆ′
is
∆2 (B,B
′, x˜′, xˆ′) ≡ u
′ (cm (B′))
u′ (c (B, x˜′))
− u
′ (cm (B′))
u′ (c (B, xˆ′))
> 0.
• In state yh three cases are possible.
– The participation constraint of agent 1 is binding for both x˜′ and xˆ′. Then we can use
the previous case. Note that the difference between the right hand side of (27) for x˜′
and xˆ′ is given by ∆1 (B, x˜′, xˆ′) + ∆2 (B,B′, x˜′, xˆ′) > 0.
– The participation constraint of agent 1 is not binding for either x′. Then the growth
rate of marginal utility is the same for x˜′ and xˆ′. In this case, the difference between
the right hand side of (27) for x˜′ and xˆ′ is given by
pieu′
(
cl (B′)
)( 1
u′ (c (B, x˜′))
− 1
u′ (c (B, xˆ′))
)
+ ∆2 (B,B
′, x˜′, xˆ′) > 0.
– The participation constraint of agent 1 is binding for xˆ′, but not for x˜′. Then
c2 (B
′, x˜′) < cl(B′). Therefore, the difference between the right hand sides of (27)
for x˜′ and xˆ′ is given by
∆1 (B, x˜
′, xˆ′) + ∆2 (B,B′, x˜′, xˆ′) +
u′ (c2 (B′, x˜′))− u′
(
cl(B′)
)
u′ (c2 (B, x˜′))
> 0.
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Finally, consider x˜′ and xˆ′ such that x˜′ ≥ xm (B′) > xˆ′. The only difference compared to
the previous case is in state ym. We have c (B′, xˆ′) < cm (B′). This implies that
∆3 (B,B
′, x˜′, xˆ′) =
u′ (cm (B′))
u′ (c (B, x˜′))
− u
′ (c (B′, xˆ′))
u′ (c(B, xˆ′))
> 0.
Hence the same argument as in the previous case follows replacing ∆2 (B,B′, x˜′, xˆ′) with
∆3 (B,B
′, x˜′, xˆ′).
Since the problem is symmetric, to establish the relationship between B′ and x′ ≤ 1, we
can consider 1/x′ ≥ 1. This means that B′ increases as x′ ≤ 1 decreases, i.e., as cross-sectional
consumption inequality increases.
If j > k, and the optimal intervals for these two states do not overlap given B, then x′
must be higher in state yj than in state yk, and we have already shown that assets depend
positively on cross-sectional consumption inequality. If the optimal intervals overlap given B,
then there exists x for which x′ = x in both states yj and yk. Aggregate savings are identical
in the two states in this case.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i). It is easy to see that r1 is implicitly defined by the
planner’s Euler, (12), with equality when agent 1 has the highest possible income. That is,
r1 is implicitly given by
u′
(C (yJ , 0, xJ(0))) = β(1 + r1)∑
j
pij
u′
(C (yj, 0, xJ(0)))
1− υ1 (yj, 0, xJ(0)) ,
If r > r1 public assets will be positive at least when income inequality is highest, while if
r ≤ r1 public assets will be zero in the long run, and will always be zero if their initial level
is zero.
Next, we show that assets are bounded, which we need for parts (ii)-(iv). They are
trivially bounded below by 0. It is easy to see that there exists a high level of inher-
ited assets, denoted B̂, such that perfect risk sharing is at least temporarily enforceable,
that is, x1
(
B̂
)
≥ xJ
(
B̂
)
. Therefore, if r < 1/β − 1, B′ (B, x′) < B for all B ≥ B̂ and
x1 (B) ≥ x′ ≥ xJ (B), i.e., assets optimally decrease; and assets stay constant if r = 1/β − 1.
This implies that assets are bounded above.
We now turn to parts (ii) and (iii). We first show that if the consumption distribution
is time-invariant, then there exists a unique constant level of assets, B∗, such that all the
conditions of constrained-efficiency are satisfied. Afterwards, we show that assets converge
almost surely to B∗ starting from any initial level B0. Then, we establish that assets remain
stochastic when the consumption distribution is time-varying (case (ii)). Finally, we show
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that case (iii) occurs when the return on storage is high but less than the discount rate, while
assets remain stochastic when the return is below some threshold, denoted r2.
Recall that if aggregate assets are constant, the optimal intervals for the relative Pareto
weight are time-invariant. Given that each agent’s participation constraint binds only for
the highest income level in the long run, the optimality condition (10) and xJ(B∗) (x1(B∗))
uniquely determine cJ (B∗) (c1 (B∗)), the time-invariant high (low) consumption level. Then,
using the planner’s Euler, we can determine the unique level of B∗ such that all optimality
conditions are satisfied. The planner’s Euler is
u′
(
cJ (B∗)
)
= β(1 + r)
[
(1− pie)u′ (cJ (B∗))+ pieu′ (c1 (B∗))] ,
where pie = piJ = pi1. Dividing both sides by u′
(
cJ (B∗)
)
, we obtain
1 = β(1 + r)
[
(1− pie) + pieu
′ (cl (B∗))
u′ (ch (B∗))
]
= β(1 + r)
[
(1− pie) + piexJ (B∗)] , (28)
where we have used (10). Note that xJ (B∗) is monotone and continuous in B∗. Further, at
B∗ = 0 the right hand side of equation (28) is larger than 1 by assumption, and at B∗ = B̂
the right hand side of (28) is smaller than 1, because xJ(B̂) = 1 and B∗ < B̂. Therefore, we
know that there exists a unique B∗ where the planner’s Euler holds with equality by setting
B′ = B = B∗.
Next, we show that assets converge almost surely to B∗ starting from any initial level, B0.
We already know that B′(B0, x′) < B0 for the ergodic range of x′ when B0 ≥ B̂, i.e., when
perfect risk sharing is (temporarily) self-enforcing, and B′(0, x′) > 0 for some x′ in the ergodic
range of x′, since r > r1 by assumption. ConsiderB∗ < B0 < B̂ first, and assume that state yJ
occurs and agent 1’s participation constraint is binding. This is without loss of generality,
because this happens with probability 1 in the long run, and the problem is symmetric
across the two agents. We know that the right hand side of (28) is smaller than 1, because
xJ (B0) < x
J (B∗). Therefore, marginal utility tomorrow has to increase relative to marginal
utility today to satisfy the planner’s Euler, therefore B′
(
B0, x
J (B0)
)
< B0. What happens
next period? The participation constraint will bind again even if the same state occurs.27
This is because B′
(
B0, x
J (B0)
)
< B0 implies xJ
(
B′
(
B0, x
J (B0)
))
> xJ (B0). Then assets
will decrease again. What if some state yj with 2 ≤ j ≤ N − 1 occurs? We know that the
participation constraints in these states are not binding for any B ≥ B∗, because they are
not binding for B∗. This means that now x′ = x = xJ (B0) < xJ
(
B′
(
B0, x
J
))
. Then, by
27Note that this never happens in the basic model.
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Claim 1, storage is lower than when the participation constraint is binding. Note that if
states
{
y2, ..., yJ−1
}
occur repeatedly, assets converge to a level below B∗. Then we are in
the case where B0 < B∗, which we now turn to.
Consider 0 ≤ B0 < B∗, and suppose again that state yJ occurs and agent 1’s participa-
tion constraint is binding. We know that xJ (B0) > xJ (B∗) in this case. Using (28) again,
it follows that B′
(
B0, x
J (B0)
)
> B0. Now, if the same state occurs next period (in fact,
any state yj with j ≥ 2), then the participation constraint is slack. This means that now
x′ = x = xJ (B0) > xJ
(
B′
(
B0, x
J (B0)
))
. Then, by Claim 1, storage is higher than when
the participation constraint is binding. This also implies that if state y1 does not occur for
many periods, assets converge to a level above B∗. Then once y1 occurs, which happens with
probability 1 in the long run, we are back to the case B0 > B∗, and assets start decreasing.28
So far we have shown that when B0 < B∗, assets increase at least in the most unequal
states. Unless we are on a path where agents get the highest income shock exactly in turns,
assets converge toward a level higher than B∗. We have also shown that whenever B0 > B∗
and an agent’s participation constraint binds, assets decrease. Again, unless one of the agents
always receives the highest shock, assets converge to a value lower than B∗. This implies that
assets oscillate around B∗. Almost-sure convergence is guaranteed because these oscillations
shrink whenever a participation constraint binds in the increasing and/or decreasing part,
which happens with probability one. To see this, note that from Claim 1 we know that
B′(B, xJ (B1)) is highest when xJ (B1) is highest. In turn, xJ (B1) is highest when B1 is
lowest. That is, the economy might get close to the highest possible B during the transition
if starting with zero public assets state y1 (or yJ) keeps occurring. Similarly, once we are
above B∗, the lowest possible level of B can be reached with a most equal state occurring
infinitely many times, if that state starts occurring when assets are at there highest possible
level. Note that the upper bound and then lower bound are reached with probability zero.
Whenever there is a switch to y1 or yJ , we get closer to B∗. Then the new possible highest
asset level is lower and the lowest asset level is higher (and again the bounds are reached
with probability zero). Then, again, the ‘circle’ shrinks when there is a switch to y1 or yJ .
Part (ii). Consider the case where in the long run there is a third state in which a
participation constraint binds. In this case, each agent’s consumption takes at least four
different values in the long run. These have to satisfy an additional participation constraint,
an additional resource constraint, and an additional Euler, which is generically impossible
28Participation constraints in more states may be binding when B is low, even if they only bind in states
y1 and yJ for B∗. However, with probability 1 assets will reach a level where the participation constraints of
the other states are no longer binding.
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for constant B.
Finally, we have to show that case (ii) occurs if r1 < r ≤ r2, while case (iii) occurs if
r2 < r < 1/β − 1. It is easy to see that B∗ is lower if r is lower, where B∗ can be computed
for any r ignoring the participation constraints of states yj with 2 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. However,
as assets decrease, the optimal intervals become narrower, and eventually c2(B) < cJ(B)
and c1(B) < cJ−1(B). Hence, r2 is implicitly given by (28) such that B∗ is such that
x2 (B∗) = xJ (B∗) (and x1 (B∗) = xJ−1 (B∗)).
Part (iv). If risk sharing were imperfect in the next period, then it would be that
cJ (B′) > c1 (B′). Then, from the planner’s Euler, (9), with β(1 + r) = 1 we have that
cJ (B′) > cJ (B), which implies that B′ > B. That is, public assets are increasing. This
means that as long as a participation constraint binds given B, the planner has an incentive
to store more. Hence, in the long run B is constant as in case (iii), and risk sharing is
perfect.
Proof of Lemma 2. We first show that if c′ is weakly increasing in x′′ next period, then c
is strictly increasing in x′ in the current period using Claim 1. Given x˜′ > xˆ′, six cases are
possible in terms of the pattern of binding participation constraints next period in a given
income state. Depending on the number of income states, the width of the optimal intervals,
and x˜′ and xˆ′, not all these types of states necessarily exist.
(i) The participation constraint of agent 1 is binding for both x˜′ and xˆ′ in state y′ next
period.29 Let x˜′′ (y′) ≡ x′′ (y′, B′ (B, x˜′) , x˜′), and similarly for xˆ′′ (y′), x˜′′ (Y − y′),
and xˆ′′ (Y − y′). Given B′ (B, x˜′) > B′ (B, xˆ′), we know that 1 < x˜′ < x˜′′ (y′) =
xy
′
(B′ (B, x˜′)) < xy
′
(B′ (B, xˆ′)) = xˆ′′ (y′), which implies y′ > Y/2. Then, x˜′ > xˆ′
and (11) imply that
1
1− υ1 (y′, B′ (B, x˜′) , x˜′) <
1
1− υ1 (y′, B′ (B, xˆ′) , xˆ′) ,
because x has to increase more from xˆ′ to xˆ′′ than from x˜′ to x˜′′. Now, by symmetry,
there is also a state Y − y′ < Y/2 next period, which occurs with the same probability
as state y′. We will show that the consumption allocation next period for this pair of
states under current Pareto weight x˜′ has a lower spread and a higher mean than the
allocation under current Pareto weight xˆ′. For this we have to consider whether PCs
bind in state Y − y′ next period.
29Clearly, if x˜′ and xˆ′ are sufficiently high, there will be no such y′.
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– First, assume that x˜′ > xY−y′ (B′ (B, x˜′)) and xˆ′ > xY−y′ (B′ (B, xˆ′)), i.e., the par-
ticipation constraint of agent 2 is binding in state Y − y′ for both x˜′ and xˆ′. Then,
by symmetry, x˜′′ (Y − y′) = 1/x˜′′ (y′) > 1/xˆ′′ (y′) = xˆ′′ (Y − y′).
– Second, assume that x˜′ ≤ xY−y′ (B′ (B, x˜′)) and xˆ′ ≤ xY−y′ (B′ (B, xˆ′)), i.e., no par-
ticipation constraint is binding in state Y −y′ for either x˜′ or xˆ′. Then, x˜′′ (Y − y′) =
x˜′ > xˆ′ = xˆ′′ (Y − y′).
– Third, assume that x˜′ > xY−y′ (B′ (B, x˜′)) and xˆ′ ≤ xY−y′ (B′ (B, xˆ′)), i.e, the par-
ticipation constraint of agent 2 is binding for x˜′ but not for xˆ′. It follows that
x˜′′ (Y − y′) = x˜′ > xY−y′ (B′ (B, x˜′)) > xY−y′ (B′ (B, xˆ′)) = xˆ′′ (Y − y′), where the
second inequality holds because B′ (B, x˜′) > B′ (B, xˆ′) and the optimal intervals are
wider when inherited assets are greater.
– Fourth, assume that x˜′ ≤ xY−y′ (B′ (B, x˜′)) and xˆ′ > xY−y′ (B′ (B, xˆ′)), i.e., the
participation constraint of agent 2 is binding for xˆ′ but not for x˜′. It follows that
x˜′′ (Y − y′) = xY−y′ (B′ (B, x˜′)) ≥ x˜′ > xˆ′ = xˆ′′ (Y − y′).
In all four cases xˆ′′ (y′) ≥ x˜′′ (y′) > x˜′′ (Y − y′) ≥ xˆ′′ (Y − y′), hence the consumption
allocation given x˜′ has a smaller spread across the states y′ and Y − y′. It also has a
higher mean, because of the higher level of inherited assets and a lower x′′, which implies
less storage next period by Claim 1 as long as xˆ′′ (y′) ≥ x˜′′ (y′) ≥ 1, which must be the
case here. As the mean decreases, expected marginal utility increases. What happens to
expected marginal utility as a result of a higher spread? Under prudence, the marginal
utility function is decreasing and convex, therefore, expected marginal utility is higher
for the more risky process. Finally, the term 1/ (1− υ1()) further increases the right
hand side of (12) given xˆ′ relative to x˜′, which implies that c is strictly increasing in x′
even if c′ is only weakly increasing in x′′.
(ii) The participation constraint of agent 1 is binding for xˆ′ but not for x˜′ in state y′ next
period. In this case, either x˜′′ (y′) ≥ xˆ′′ (y′) or x˜′′ (y′) < xˆ′′ (y′). If x˜′′ (y′) ≥ xˆ′′ (y′)
consumption next period is higher for x˜′, because of a higher current Pareto weight and
more resources than for xˆ′. This implies a lower marginal utility tomorrow for x˜′. In
addition, once again the term 1/ (1− υ1()) further increases the right hand side of (12)
given xˆ′ relative to x˜′. If x˜′′ (y′) < xˆ′′ (y′), then we can use the same argument as in
case (i). Since x˜′′ (y′) = x˜′ > xy′ (B′ (B, x˜′)), expected marginal utility next period is
yet lower given x˜′ for this reason.
(iii) No participation constraint is binding for x˜′ or xˆ′ next period. In this case, consumption
next period is strictly higher for x˜′ than for xˆ′ because of a higher B′, so marginal utility
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next period is strictly lower for x˜′ than for xˆ′, and both 1/ (1− υ1())s are 1.
(iv)-(vi) The participation constraint of agent 2 is binding for x˜′, or for xˆ′, or for both next period.
In these cases, we can use similar arguments as above to show that x˜′′ (y′) > xˆ′′ (y′),
and hence consumption next period is strictly higher for x˜′ than for xˆ′.
In all six types of states (or pairs of states), the right hand side of (12) is strictly lower for
x˜′ than for xˆ′, therefore the left hand side must be strictly lower as well. This means that c
must be strictly higher when x′ is higher, given that c′ depends positively on x′′.
Proposition 1 shows that assets converge to a constant level in the long run almost surely
if r is higher than some threshold r2. That is, in the long run the characteristics of allocations
are the same as in the basic model (while aggregate consumption is Y + rB∗ rather than Y ),
in particular, c strictly increases with x′. Then, moving backwards in time, c must strictly
increase with x′ in all periods.
Finally, we know that the solution is unique, therefore we can conclude that it is charac-
terized by the consumption of agent 1 increasing in x′ for all r such that assets are constant
in the long run.
Proof of Claim 2. From Claim 1 it is clear that B is approached if a least unequal income
state, denoted ym, happens repeatedly, while B is approached with state yJ (or y1) happening
many times in a row.
If B is part of the stationary distribution, then it must be that B ≥ B. This means
that there are less and less resources available over time while assets approach B, hence the
relevant participation constraint always binds along this path. The planner’s Euler
u′ (cm (B))) ≥ β(1 + r) [pieu′ (C (yl, B, xm(B)))+ (1− 2pie)u′ (cm (B))
+pieu′
(C (yh, B, xm(B)))]
as equality defines B if B > 0. If at B = 0 this Euler is satisfied as a strict inequality, then
the lower bound is 0.
The upper limit of the stationary distribution, B, is approached from below, hence,
along that path, the highest shock (state yJ or y1) happens repeatedly and no participation
constraint binds. Let B1 denote the level of inherited assets when we switch to state yJ
(or y1), and let B˜ denote the level of assets to where B converges. Note that along this path
the relative Pareto weight is constant at xJ (B1). Given B1, B˜ is the solution to the following
system:
u′
(
C2
(
yJ , B˜, xJ (B1)
))
u′
(
C
(
yJ , B˜, xJ (B1)
)) = xJ (B1)
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C
(
yJ , B˜, xJ (B1)
)
+ C2
(
yJ , B˜, xJ (B1)
)
= Y + rB˜
u′
(
C
(
yJ , B˜, xJ (B1)
))
= β(1 + r)
J∑
j=1
piju′
(
C
(
yj, B˜, xJ (B1)
))
. (29)
We have to find B1 such that B˜ is equal to B, the upper limit of the stationary distribution.
Using Claim 1, we know that B′(B, xJ (B1)) is highest when xJ (B1) is highest. In turn,
xJ (B1) is highest when B1 is lowest, i.e., when B1 is equal to the lower limit of the stationary
distribution of assets, B. Then, replacing xJ (B1) with xJ (B) and B˜ with B in (29) gives (20).
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) It is easy to see that storage is never used when its return
is close to -1, i.e., as long as it is below some threshold r˜1. (ii) It is similarly easy to see
that storage in equilibrium implies storage in autarky. This follows from the fact that the
planner’s and the agents’ saving incentives are the same when income inequality is highest,
i.e., when the incentive to store is highest, and agents’ Euler inequality is more stringent
in autarky than in equilibrium with some risk sharing. Then, if storage only takes place in
autarky, the only effect of storage is that the value of agents’ outside option increases, which
reduces risk sharing and welfare. However, the value of autarky does not matter matter as
long as perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing, hence, as long as that is the case, access to
storage is welfare neutral. (iii) As r further increases to above the threshold r˜2, according
to Proposition 1 the planner finds public storage optimal. However, by continuity, at this
point the negative effect of the increase in the value of autarky dominates the positive effect
of the (small) stock of public assets on risk sharing. Therefore, welfare still goes down as a
result of access to storage. (iv)-(v) If r = 1/β − 1, perfect risk sharing occurs and aggregate
consumption is Y + rB∗ rather than Y , therefore welfare is strictly higher in the long run.
Further, consumption dispersion is zero. Then, for any r in a small neighborhood of 1/β − 1,
the positive effect of the increase in aggregate consumption dominates the negative effect
of the increase in the value of autarky, hence welfare improves. For such r, consumption
dispersion is small. By continuity there exists r˜2 < r˜3 < 1/β − 1 where the two welfare levels
are equalized. At this level of storage return, aggregate consumption has to be higher than
in the basic model (at least after some histories). Hence, welfare can be the same only if
consumption dispersion is higher than in the basic model. By continuity this should hold
above r˜3 as well until the threshold r˜4 ≤ 1/β − 1.
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B Computation
We use the recursive system given by equations (10)-(15) to solve the model numerically. We
discretize x and B (y is assumed to take a finite number of values). We have to determine x′
and B′ on a 3-dimensional grid on X = (y,B, x). The initial values for V (X ′), C (X ′), and
υ1 (X
′) are from the solution of a model where the participation constraints are ignored. We
iterate until the value and policy functions converge.
As we proceed, we use the characteristics of the solution. In particular, we know that if
agent 1’s participation constraint binds at x˜, it also binds at all x < x˜. Similarly, if agent 2’s
participation constraint binds at xˆ, it also bind at all x > xˆ. At each iteration, at each
income state and for each B, we solve directly for the limits x˜ and xˆ using (13) and (14)
with equality, respectively, first assuming that B′ = 0. Afterwards, we check whether the
planner’s Euler is satisfied at the limits. If not, we solve a 2-equation system of (12) and
(13) (or (14)), with unknowns B′ and x′. Finally, we solve for a new B′ at points on the x
grid where neither participation constraint binds, i.e., at the interior of the optimal interval
for (y,B) of the current iteration.
C Validity of the first-order-condition approach
In Section 3 we assumed that by introducing agents’ participation constraints and Euler
inequalities (equations (23) and (24), respectively) in Problem P1 we guarantee incentive
compatibility. In other words, we assumed that the constrained-optimal allocation can be
obtained by checking that agents have no incentive to default given that they do not have
private assets, and that they have no incentive to store given that they never default. In
principle, they may still find it optimal to use more complicated ‘double’ deviations involving
both storage and default, potentially in different time periods, given some history of income
shocks.
First, note that we have already considered contemporaneous joint deviations, i.e., when
the agent defaults and saves at the same time.30 In the participation constraint (23) we use
U˜aui (st), the value of autarky when the agent can store (see equation (25)). Further, note
that in autarky the agent is allowed to store whenever this makes him better off. Therefore,
the ‘default today and store later’-type of double deviations are already taken care of as well.
30In the literature with private information, a similar joint deviation, shirking (or misreporting income) and
saving, is the relevant deviation. Detailed discussion of these joint deviations can be found for the hidden
income case in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), and for the hidden action (dynamic moral hazard) case in
Kocherlakota (2004) and Ábrahám, Koehne, and Pavoni (2011).
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This implies that the only potentially profitable double deviations we still need to consider
are those which involve private asset accumulation in the current period and default in a
later period.
We can show analytically that as long as the constrained-efficient consumption values do
not exceed the autarky consumption value when the agent holds no private assets, ‘default
today and store later’-type of double deviations are never profitable for the agents.31 However,
for high values of r, the highest possible consumption value in equilibrium is higher.32 In
fact, Nozawa (2013) shows, in a one-sided limited commitment framework, that there exists
a profitable deviation in the case where β(1 + r) = 1, and this deviation involves saving
one period and defaulting the next. Note that the deviation happens when the economy
has reached its long-run equilibrium and perfect risk sharing occurs, and that the agent’s
participation constraint holds with equality when he gets the highest possible income. In our
model these conditions are satisfied only when public assets converge to their lowest possible
long-run value given an efficient technology, a zero-probability event. Other than in a small
neighborhood of this case, we provide a numerical algorithm to verify that ‘store first and
default later’-type of double deviations are not welfare-improving.
In order to verify that agents have no incentive to use ‘store first and default later’-
type of double deviations, we show numerically that given any level of hidden assets, public
assets, incomes, and the inherited relative Pareto weight, agents are better off receiving
as endowment the consumptions assigned by the constrained-efficient risk-sharing contract
rather than their own incomes today and in the future. In order to see this, along with the
autarky consumption-saving problem, we solve the consumption-saving problem of an agent
who receives the constrained-efficient consumption process as ‘income.’ Having computed
the constrained-efficient policy functions as described in Appendix B, this is without concep-
tual difficulty, however, the computational cost is rather high, given that there are four state
variables, three of which are continuous. We again exploit the characteristics of the solu-
tion, namely that the current Pareto weight takes values within an optimal state-dependent
interval, in order to shorten computation time.
In examples we have studied, we find that agents are always better off receiving the
constrained-efficient consumptions given any level of already accumulated private assets
rather than the autarky incomes. Hence, they will never revert to autarky and will never
store in a hidden fashion, as long as the first-order conditions are satisfied.
31The proof is available upon request.
32In the long run this only happens for returns ‘close’ to the efficient level, but during the transition this
may happen for returns below the threshold r2 in Proposition 1 as well. This is easy to verify in computed
examples.
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